State-centrism has been an enduring feature of International Relations theory.
with the state and with international institutions.
The realm of security has traditionally been largely resistant to claims about the need to unpack state-centric conceptions of authority; indeed many studies of security privatisation have if anything served to reinforce it. For example, to the extent that private security actors have been included in the literature on non-state authority, they have generally been described in two main ways. First, there is a tendency to associate the rise of private security with a corresponding erosion of state sovereignty. This is of course a well-known theme in studies of globalisation, which is frequently seen as indicating a long-term shift from state-centric forms of governance towards a dispersal of power and authority towards private actors and international organisations.
v Given that most definitions of the state centre on the monopoly of the means of violence, it is not surprising that the rise of private security actors tends to be interpreted as a loss of, or threat to, state power. Second, when private security actors have been considered in the literature on non-state authority and governance, they are frequently regarded as illegitimate actors. Until recently, discussions of security privatisation, particularly in Africa, were primarily focused on the role of "mercenaries", vi with the image of the "return of the dogs of war" hovering ominously in the background. vii From this followed an easy, moral condemnation of private security actors. Thus, in the most extensive treatment of private security actors as a form of private authority they are classified as exercising "illicit" authority, alongside mafias and militias.
viii Neither of these interpretations is necessarily wrong, however both provide an unhelpfully restricted means of grasping the shifting structures of security and authority emerging from privatisation. As regards the first, while there is little doubt that private security may in certain settings be an indication of state weakness or pose a threat to the state, this cannot be taken to be universally true. Authority is not necessarily a zero-sum game, and it is equally possible that private force can strengthen and support the authority of the state. Similarly, while private security may under certain circumstances be "illicit", glossing over the differences between "mercenaries" and corporate private security companies ix provides an unduly narrow view of the range of security privatisation, ignoring the vast majority of activities which are entirely legal and often conducted alongside and in co-operation with public security forces.
x In short, assuming that private security is either an erosion of state authority, or that it stands outside legitimate (state) authority, obscures the breadth of its operations and the conceptual and political challenges it poses to understanding the nature and functioning of authority in the contemporary global order.
In this article we argue that the globalisation of private security provides a striking illustration of the shifting structures of global governance and highlights the importance of prying apart the "state, territory, authority"-triptych. To do so, we broaden the scope of analysis away from the preoccupation with military privatisation to focus instead on the globalisation of private commercial security, that is, the much more mundane, day-to-day activities of security companies operating mostly (but not exclusively) in non-conflict environments and dedicated to protecting "life and assets". We argue that private security can be seen to wield considerable authoritydefined as the right and ability legitimately to speak and act-in contemporary international politics. This authority in turn arises from a multiplicity of sources that are intimately linked to global discourses and transformations. Far from standing in opposition to state power in a zero-sum game, private security actors often draw legitimacy precisely from their connections to the state. Analyses of the emergence of non-state authority have pointed to the importance of broad shifts in global governance, and to a significant extent, the authority of PSCs is also linked to these transformations. In particular, the authority of PSCs is facilitated by three key developments; first, the dominance of neoliberal economic policies;
second, the commodification of security and its concomitant constitution as a realm of expert knowledge; and third, the integration of PSCs into "hybrid" security networks. The first two sources of authority are closely related. As analyses of the 6 shifting nature of authority in the global system have commonly stressed, the increasing dominance of neoliberal economic ideas and policies facilitate the social power and globalisation of private property and capital. It also facilitates the ability of private actors to claim expertise over a given domain or issue area, and thus to wield authority in relation to it. xxvi The "market authority" of PSCs is inseparable from the ascendancy of neoliberal ideas, and the most basic form of authority exercised by PSCs is that which they derive from property rights, and from the "principal-agent" relationship between private security and the private property of its clients. As Sarre points out, "Unlike the public police, whose power is found generally in the various law enforcement statutes, the power of private security personnel derives principally from their being legal "agents" of those who control or own private property". xxvii In a majority of cases, the authority of private security arises from the right to enforce a combination of the "law of contract" dictating an implied or actual contract between the owners of property and those who come onto it (such as, for example, conditions on the conduct of visitors to a site); the "law of property" declaring the right to control the use of property and access to it (particularly the right of exclusion); and the "industrial law" concerning the relations between employers and employees (a typical example being the rule that employees are subject to search when entering or leaving the site). PSCs thus draw authority as the agents of legitimate principals, whose position is itself based in the legitimating principles and legal status of property rights.
A second dimension of the authority of PSCs derives from broader processes involved in the commodification of security. The neoliberal transformations of the last three decades have seen not only a substantial out-sourcing of public security functions, but also an increasing acceptance of PSCs" status as market actors who provide a "service" that can be bought and sold on a free market. As part of this process, the provision of security has become less tightly identified with the direct and exclusive authority of state officials, and reconfigured as a market in which the public is composed of consumers rather than clients -a realm of individuals actively engaged in making choices about their security provision within a marketplace where public authorities are only one (albeit an important and in many ways still privileged)
provider. xxviii Belief in the models of the commercial enterprise as the most efficient form of service delivery, of the public as consumers, and of a security market comprised of both public and private providers have become important elements in the conceptualisation and delivery of security. Security has now become to a significant extent a technique and a form of expert knowledge that, while specialised, is by no means the sole purview of public authorities and that may in fact be more effectively exercised by private providers. These trends have facilitated a specific form of depoliticization, a de-linking of security from public authority that is related to the growth of private security, as well as to its legitimation and the authority it wields.
The combination of principal-agent relationships (where PSCs act on behalf of the rights possessed by those who own or control property) and the treatment of security as a service xxix to be provided in the market is an important foundation of the authority of private security in both its actions on behalf of clients and in the process of expanding its own markets and global operations. As a result of these various processes, contracting private security has become increasingly commonplace.
Although geographically varied, hiring private security is now standard practice for many commercial enterprises, international organisations and increasing numbers of private individuals, and it is widely accepted -and often encouraged -by public authorities with which it has entered into increasingly close relationships.
It is precisely this closer relationship to public authority that provides the third source of authority for PSCs. Whereas the rise of private authority is often interpreted as an indication of declining state power, there is increasing evidence to suggest that the strict public/private distinction is losing its relevance both empirically and conceptually. Rather than clearly delineated spheres of private and public authority, the governance of particular realms emerges more often than not out of a combination and co-operation of public and private actors. Again, broader global discourses and practices such as New Public Management strategies and moves toward public-private partnerships are of key importance here, and although states are not necessarily the instigator of such "hybrid" forms of governance, they lend them strength and legitimacy through official recognition and/or incorporation into domestic/international law. xxx States can also frequently be seen to benefit from the more widespread use of private governance mechanisms, and may, as Robert
Falkner argues in the case of environmental governance, choose to let private actors establish systems of self-regulation and thus be relieved of the arduous burden of negotiation, implementation and enforcement. In the security field, the development of hybrid public-private structures has become increasingly widespread.
xxxii Public policing in many countries has undergone a process of reform in accordance with neoliberal reforms and pressures. New Public Management strategies, outsourcing, marketization, and consumer-driven logics have resulted in a "pluralisation" and "fragmentation" of policing, so that the public police are only one among many security actors. As a number of the most incisive analysts of security privatisation have stressed, private security cannot be grasped simply by contrasting it to public authority. Instead, the distinctions between private and public security are being blurred and reconfigured, fusing into networks of institutions and practices. As Loader has put it: "Security must now be taken to refer to a whole range of technologies and practices provided, not only by public bodies such as the police or local authorities, but also by commercial concerns competing in the marketplace. We have unfolding….an uneven, patchwork of security hardware and services, with provision increasingly determined by people"s willingness and ability to pay". xxxiii In such contexts, far from being in opposition to the state, PSCs often draw legitimacy precisely from their connections to public authority.
This does not mean that traditional distinctions are irrelevant: the concepts of public and private and their different forms of authority remain important. In particular, public security authorities retain legislative authorisation and a breadth of jurisdiction that no other actors possess xxxiv , and private security usually operates within a regulatory framework of some kind. However, the public and private sectors need to be treated not as mutually exclusive kinds of actors and realms of activity, but as broadly heuristic concepts that allow different dimensions of a security network to come into focus. The key is to recognise the complex relationships between private security and public authority, and the way in which the authority of these various networks arises from a combination of different sources, including public authorisation, private expertise, private property rights, and neoliberal ideology. In other words, "state, territory, authority" cannot be assumed to be coterminous, as private authority stretches across territorial boundaries, but not necessarily in a zerosum game with the authority of public forces and institutions.
Security and private authority in Cape Town
South Africa has one of the world"s most highly privatised and globalised security sectors, and as a percentage of GDP, the country has the largest private security sector in the world. xxxv In the space of a short decade, the post-apartheid private security industry has moved from being regarded by the Government as largely illegitimate, and potentially politically subversive, to becoming increasingly integrated into public-private partnerships and perceived as crucial to the maintenance of law and order. This transformation has taken place in a profoundly transnational space,
where PSCs have derived authority from global markets, claims to expert knowledge, as well as the turn to neo-liberal modes of governance.
The context for South Africa"s massive private security expansion is of course the transition to majority rule, which was accompanied by high crime rates and pervasive fear among the white minority. By the end of apartheid in 1994, there were three times as many private security personnel as public police officers, xxxvi and from 1997
to 2000 the number of security officers grew from 115,000 to 166,000. xxxvii As the armed forces were down-sized and career opportunities for previously privileged groups were curtailed in both the police and armed forces, scores of white officers fled the public sector to join the burgeoning private security business. South Africa"s security market became one of the fastest growing in the world, experiencing annual growth rates of 30% in the mid-1990s. The immediate post-apartheid era saw considerable suspicion towards the expanding PSC sector. As the relative balance between public policing and private security tipped in favour of the private, both in terms of personnel and firepower, the under-resourced police force at times jealously guarded their status and role vis-à-vis a highly capitalised private sector that sported not only new patrol vehicles, but frequently also the very latest in surveillance and communications technologies.
Police and politicians alike questioned private security"s "real" commitment to the reduction of crime, pointing to the obvious connection between commercial success and the continuation and fear of crime. While the idea of companies "profiting from crime" was antithetical to the worldview of many ANC politicians, the police regarded 1 0 it as an affront to their professional obligation to "protect life and property", regardless of ability to pay.
In addition to this ideological opposition and the police"s defence of their status, scepticism and distrust of private security arose from two additional factors. First, the fact that a largely white-owned sector employed a predominantly low-paid, black labour force to guard white wealth was seen as an obstacle to the creation of the "new" South Africa. Moreover, many of South Africa"s PSCs were owned and managed by former officers of the apartheid state"s oppressive apparatuses and the predominance of former intelligence, defence and police personnel gave rise to fears and allegations that the sector harboured right-wing sympathies, and that private militias were being formed by security companies. xlii Private security was accordingly seen as an obstacle, and even a potential threat, to South Africa"s fledgling democracy.
Second, suspicions were voiced that foreign involvement in the sector might be used The CCID is in effect a large-scale partnership policing effort aimed at making central Cape Town safe and secure; an international city and a first class tourist destination. liv Group4Securicor, trading in Cape Town as Securicor, has been 1 3 contracted as the main security provider. At the start of the initiative, the CCID security force consisted of only seven officers, but it has since expanded to a total of six patrol vehicles, ten horse mounted officers and 60 foot patrol officers providing a 24-hour security presence in the city centre. At night, the city is patrolled by 40 officers, supported by six vehicles. As a result, the presence of security personnel in the city has increased significantly, and during daytime, the CCID vehicles and foot patrols are frequently encountered throughout Cape Town"s relatively compact city centre.
To a significant extent, the security of Cape Town has been devolved to the second largest security company in the world. The visibility of Securicor"s mounted, on-foot or mobile patrols far exceeds the visibility of the police. Both the City Police and the SAPS concentrate their efforts in the poorer areas of town, where crime rates are highest, and the City Police have dedicated only two mobile patrols to the city centre. lv Moreover, the police do not conduct foot patrols. Yet, it would be incorrect to perceive the police as absent from Cape Town"s security arrangement. Securicor officers work in close collaboration with the police, especially the City Police, but also the SAPS. The CCID/Securicor branded patrol vehicles include a City Police officer, although there are no police markings on the car. The CCID security patrols are also linked to the City Police control room by radio. Furthermore, Securicor operates the Strategic Surveillance Unit (SSU), the control room that supervises Cape Town"s 170
close circuit television cameras. The surveillance cameras were initially financed by the association "Business Against Crime", and then donated to the city. The SSU is manned by around 50 Securicor officers, reinforced by eight City Police officers, and is in direct contact with the SAPS as well as the City Police, ensuring mobile response to incidents. As part of the move towards community or sector policing, Securicor also participate in weekly sector policing fora to identify potential problems, share information and co-ordinate the provision of security with the SAPS and the City Police. Securicor officers in the CCID also frequently provide support to police operations within the city, for example by providing perimeter security when police are searching a building or area. This is indicative of the breadth of change, seen also in the other CIDs in Cape Town. What is emerging is a network of public and private, global and local security actors, and Securicor managers refer to the CIDs as a "paradigm shift" because of this close co-operation.
lvi
The CCID is a striking example of the contemporary dissolution of the "state, territory, authority" marriage. Within this security arrangement, significant authority over 1 4 domestic territory resides with a global PSC. This authority is, in turn, linked in important ways to global discourses and practices. Market principles exercise a particularly powerful influence, and the authority of Securicor derives in large part from the company acting as the agent of the city"s property owners, and it is seen as entirely legitimate that rate-payers fund and to a large degree oversee a system with security at its core. CCID is a contractual community between ratepayers, businesses and the City Council, and security is regarded as a service like any other, to be bought from the best qualified provider. The commodification of security enables the CCID to present itself as a consumer (as opposed to a client) of security, actively making choices about security provision within a market place where public authorities are only one possible provider. Within this market place, Securicor as a global brand with significant material resources can claim significant expert knowledge and authority. The CCIDs" choice of Securicor was directly related to the company"s extensive organisational and financial resources, technical and managerial capabilities, as well as its global reputation and brand recognition.
Importantly, there is a key difference between the CCID and the private guarding of "public private spaces" lvii such as shopping centres, in that here a private company is policing a public space.
At the same time, it is clear that the security arrangements in the CCID are far from entirely private; the City Council makes up one third of the Cape Town Partnership, and the public police play an important role in security provision. The CCID derives considerable legitimacy precisely from its incorporation into hybrid security networks, and security governance in Cape Town emerges out of a combination of private and public authority. These public-private networks highlight the inadequacies of regarding private security as straightforward threat to the sovereignty of the state, or as "illicit" authority. In Cape Town, and South Africa more generally, PSCs have to an important extent helped secure the authority of the state, by allowing for the presence of a much larger security force than the state alone could have afforded, thus providing important concrete and symbolic resources for combating posttransition insecurity, and increasing urban blight and capital flight. In brief, the utilisation of private security resources has made it easier for the government to claim that it is "doing something about crime".
In the case of Cape Town, the exact achievements of the CCID in terms of crime reduction are difficult to assess, given the South African moratorium on the release on local crime statistics, but there is a clear sense that the city is safer now than only cannot be assumed that the state will always and inevitably be in a position of control -or even of obvious primacy -in such security networks. Sovereign state power, in other words, is not static in these global structures of governance, nor can the primacy of the state be automatically assumed. As Johnston has observed, state power, the manner in which it is consolidated and distributed is contingent on social and political conditions. lxi
The shifting boundaries of public/private authority also have political and social implications. While the increasing authority of PSCs is commonly justified and explained in terms of economic logic and efficiency, it simultaneously has implications in terms of who gets secured and how. In the CCID, those who pay are also able to play a powerful role in determining the security agenda. In Cape Town this has led to a focus on "cleaning up the city". In the words of the Provincial Development Council of the Western Cape: "In order to become a "world class city"…we must vanquish "crime and grime"… and remove the "undesirable elements"". lxii While this has resulted in an impressive 24 hours cleaning service, it is 1 6 also reflected in a security effort focused on "order maintenance" and on reducing what are often described as "minor nuisances" like beggars, vagrants, informal parking assistants, and street children. Securicor officers are instructed to "move along" beggars congregating at intersections. For "undesirable elements", such as street children and vagrants the CCID has meant increased harassment and more frequent arrest. Street children are regarded as a special problem, allegedly perceived by Capetonians and tourists alike as not only a nuisance, but as responsible for the majority of petty crime. lxiii Securicor officers frequently transport street children to so-called safe-houses, in order to get them off the street, in full knowledge that they will be back the next day. A number of by-laws have also been passed to facilitate the clean-up of Cape Town, including prohibition of begging which inhibits or obstructs the public, begging within six meters of an automatic teller machine/cash point, and also the washing and drying of clothes in city streets.
lxiv
The CCID recognises that the causes of vagrancy and homelessness are social and cannot be solved by security measures alone, and has appointed a social development officer and five street workers to help street children and homeless adults. In addition, the Partnership sponsors one of the city"s organisations providing shelter for the homeless. Social services, however, account for a relatively small amount of the CCID"s budget (8%), and the exclusionary elements of the city improvement districts are hard to dispute. For sections of the population in Cape Town, the altered politics of protection brought about by the CCID is experienced as an increasing restriction of access to public space, as a combination of public bylaws and private enforcement serve to prevent the poor and the homeless from utilising the city"s public spaces. Importantly for our argument here, the social fragmentation that follows from such exclusionary security practices may ultimately pose political challenges for the state as the question of legitimate access to and activities within public spaces has the potential to raise difficult questions in a networked security environment.
Conclusion
The extraordinary growth and globalisation of the private security sector presents complex analytical and political challenges. In particular, the development of publicprivate, global-local security networks challenge too-easy an ascription of authority solely to the public security agencies of the sovereign state. Indeed, the development 1 7
of global private security firms, and the existence of public-private, global-local security networks can be seen, as analysts of globalisation have pointed out in other realms, as part of increasingly important structures of global governance in which the role of the state -and the nature and locus of authority -is being transformed and rearticulated.
Seen in this context, the authority of private security arises from three sources. First, the expansion of private security has been both a product and an enabler of broader liberal processes of globalisation, and the authority of private security needs to be seen in light of its relationship to the authority of private property. At one level, this involves its relationship to transnational property rights and the expansion of global capital. But it is also a consequence of broader shifts in the provision of security in both developed and developing countries, and of widespread perceptions that public authorities cannot provide adequate security and that private security is a necessary response. Private security firms have been empowered both politically and in market terms by this shift, and by the broader process of commodification that has seen security increasingly treated as a service to be sold on an open market, provided by the most efficient and effective actors and, in consequence, significantly de-linked from its status as a monopoly of public authorities.
Second, these processes of privatisation and commodification have allowed private security firms to acquire the status of being legitimate authorities in these areas, possessing significant expert knowledge and technical, financial, and organisational capacities specific to this field. Both private clients and public actors now turn with increasing frequency to private companies as a means of analysing and addressing security situations, and while security firms" authority to act is usually limited by statute, their ability to act as legitimate and ever more pervasive private providers and public "partners" is increasing.
Third, the authority of PSCs arises from their increasing incorporation in hybrid security networks. These networks are neither disconnected from state authority, nor reducible to it. They represent important new arrangements in the delivery of security, as well as powerful actors able to wield significant authority in the security field.
While security has often been seen as the sector most resistant to forms of non-state governance, we hope to have shown that a focus on the broad processes of 1 8
globalisation and privatisation at work in the security industry demonstrates the emergence of public-private, global-local security networks that have considerable impact on the day-to-day provision of security, and that have implications for broader issues of social stability and state legitimacy. This process cannot be grasped simply by seeing it as the erosion of state authority, or as the opposite: the straightforward strengthening of the state through the integration of private capacities. What is emerging is a much more complex structure, whose political effects challenge the conventional conflation of government, territory and authority that have for so long dominated thinking about both security and international relations.
There is little doubt that private security raises key political and normative issues.
However, these debates must take place in light of a clear recognition that the boundaries of the public and private, the global and the local have already undergone significant transformations. While the example of Cape Town"s Central City Improvement District is unusual in its extensive integration of public/private, global/local security actors, public-private security partnerships are spreading not only in South Africa, but also across the continent. In many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, private security companies are integrated into complex networks of authority that challenges any clear cut distinction of public/private and global/local authority.
Far from being "illicit", security privatisation as a form of private authority is at the heart of networks of global governance and is crucial to an understanding of contemporary international politics.
